The International Community Versus Africa

             Africa is a part of the world vital to the rest of the international community.  Donor countries are concerned about the role African nations play on the world stage in helping to resolve conflicts or in standing in solidarity in the fight against terrorism.  International financial institutions and the business community worldwide are concerned with the impact African countries have on the global economy.  Civil society organizations are concerned with the welfare of Africa’s people.  So, it isn’t as though Africa is completely ignored, but a lack of understanding about the true nature of African societies by non-Africans leads to a blurring of differences between African governments and African people.  You see it in the remedies implemented in response to the coups that unfortunately have ramped up lately on the continent and the conflicts that ravage countries and spill over into neighbors.

            Sanctions are often threatened in response to conflicts and coups in Africa, but they can do more harm than good when they’re applied as a blunt instrument.  For example, there has been quite a bit of talk about sanctioning the Government of Ethiopia for its part in the current conflict in the Tigray region.  That government isn’t the only combatant in this conflict, and the use of countrywide sanctions, such a suspension from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) benefits has been considered.  However, that demonstrates a misunderstanding of how that trade program works.  It is evaluated in a government-to-government manner, which ignores the fact that it is in reality a business-to-business platform. 

When you suspend a government from AGOA benefits, you’re really punishing mostly private companies.  I and some of my colleagues have over the years advocated exemptions for companies that do not have significant government connections.  It is difficult in African countries to have no connections to government or friends of government, and it is difficult to determine the extent of government or allies’ involvement in companies, so the notion of exemptions has never gotten very far.

What has been proposed for many years is a sanctions weapon that is more surgical and punishes those in government and their allies who violate human rights, interfere with the provision of humanitarian assistance and cause or enable conflicts that displace thousands and result in the starvation, rape, injury, torture and the deaths of thousands.  In 2012, such a policy tool was devised. It was the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, but it is more popularly known as the Magnitsky
Act.

The Jackson–Vanik legislation was an amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, a provision in U.S. federal law intended to affect U.S. trade relations with countries with non-market economies (originally, countries of the Communist bloc) that restricted freedom of Jewish emigration and other human rights issues. Over time, a number of countries were granted conditional normal trade relations subject to annual review, liberating them from the amendment. The Magnitsky Act repealed the application of the Jackson–Vanik amendment to Russia and gave normal U.S. trade relations to Russia and Moldova. Magnitsky sanctions instead punishes individuals violating human rights wherever in the world such violations occur.

The Magnitsky Act was named after Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer and auditor who in 2008 uncovered a complex web of tax fraud and graft involving 23 companies and a total of $230 million linked to the Kremlin and individuals close to the Russian government. Magnitsky was the target of investigations and was arrested by authorities and kept in jail for a prolonged period without charges. He was beaten and later died in jail under mysterious circumstances just days before his potential release.

Beginning in 2013, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a division of the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a list of individuals and entities sanctioned un the Magnitsky Act.  As regards Africa, those sanctioned included: Dan Gertler, a businessman and associate of then-DRC President Joseph Kabila;  Filipos Woldeyohannes, Chief of Staff of the Eritrean Defense Forces; Kale Kayihura, former Inspector General of the Uganda Police Force, and Musa Seka Baluku, a Ugandan rebel leader of the Allied Democratic Forces.

Individual sanctions don’t disturb legitimate economic activity, and offers a more precise means of punishing government officials and their private sector supporters.  Such sanctions are particularly valuable in dealing with governments in countries such as Eritrea, where there isn’t a U.S. economic relationship that can be withdrawn.  OFAC has just sanctioned several individuals and entities in Eritrea that have been judged to be complicit in that government’s involvement in the Tigray conflict: Hagos Ghebrehiwet (Kisha), Abraha Kassa Nemariam, Hidri Trust and the Red Sea Corporation.  Further sanctions on other individuals and entities may be considered. 

 Such sanctions would not have been possible without the Magnitsky Act.  Government officials and their cronies most fear losing their personal wealth.  They already loot their country’s treasuries, so punishing the government itself too often misses the target, but their ill-gotten gains stashed in banks around the world can be targeted and frozen by OFAC, particularly if such funds are located in U.S.-controlled financial institutions or involve dollar-denominated transactions anywhere in the world.

The Magnitsky Act was initially inspired by the fight to control corruption, but it also allows for the ability to punish entities and private individuals who violate human rights or facilitate conflict.  Thus, Magnitsky sanctions would be an ideal tool to discourage continued conflict in areas such as Tigray by targeting those responsible for the human tragedy that this conflict has caused.

There are numerous sanctions tools that could be invoked, but they seem to lose steam beyond designations in reports.  When a country is declared a Country of Particular Concern over violations of religious freedom, how punishing have the sanctions been?  Such sanctions were never intended to be rhetorical, but Nigeria has for several years been considered the most dangerous place in the world for Christians.  How significantly have the CPC sanctions hurt Nigeria’s government?

AGOA suspensions hurt legitimate businesses as well as crony companies, but companies often just move over the border to operate as a registered company in another AGOA country.  I saw this in 2011 when I attended the AGOA Forum in Zambia and met Zimbabwe companies that had relocated in order to take advantage of AGOA benefits they were denied at home.  The ones I spoke with seemed to be legitimate firms forced to relocate, and crony companies, dependent on the largess of their friendly government, would be at a disadvantage in a foreign country without that support.

The sanctioning of the Eritrean entities and individuals sends the message that miscreants, no matter how well-connected, are not outside the ability of the international community to punish their misdeeds.  In using targeted sanctions, the United States and the rest of the international community can fight corruption and human rights abuses without unduly harming African publics.  In that way, it will be the international community versus evildoers and not the international community versus Africa.