Africa’s Horn Claims Yet Another U.S. Special Envoy

 

On April 23, 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken proudly announced the appointment of Jeffrey Feltman as the U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa.  The Horn of Africa, sometimes referred to as the Somali Peninsula, is composed of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti, but problems in these countries also impact Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and  Uganda.

 In announcing Feltman’s appointment, Secretary Blinken said: “This appointment underscores the Administration’s commitment to lead an international diplomatic effort to address the interlinked political, security, and humanitarian crises in the Horn of Africa.  Having held senior positions in both the State Department and the United Nations, Special Envoy Feltman is uniquely suited to bring decades of experience in Africa and the Middle East, in multilateral diplomacy, and in negotiation and mediation to develop and execute an integrated U.S. strategy to address these complex regional issues.”

Feltman made several visits to the region, focusing on ending the destructive conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region.  However, despite his long experience in diplomacy, Feltman was unable to make significant progress in his role.  Less than a year into his term, he left his position and was replaced as Special Envoy this past January by Ambassador David Satterfield.  Secretary Blinken praised Satterfield for bringing his diplomatic experience and his willingness to take on this role in a complex, troubled region of Africa.

“Ambassador Satterfield’s decades of diplomatic experience and work amidst some of the world’s most challenging conflicts will be instrumental in our continued effort to promote a peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa and to advance U.S. interests in this strategic region,” Secretary Blinken said.

Unfortunately, less than half a year after Ambassador Satterfield took office, Secretary Blinken had to replace him – this time with Mike Hammer,  another senior Foreign Service diplomat who began his diplomatic career in 1988. 

“I look forward to the energy and vision that Ambassador Hammer will now lend to our efforts in the Horn of Africa.  His appointment underscores our abiding commitment to diplomatic efforts in the region, most urgently in support of an inclusive political process towards peace, common security, and prosperity for all people in Ethiopia,” Secretary Blinken said 

So, in less than 18 months, the United States is on its third Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa.  It isn’t for lack of diplomatic credentials of the envoys nor in interest by the current Administration in resolving crises there.  Obviously, there other reasons why the Administration cannot keep a Special Envoy on the job in the Horn.

First of all, the region faces a multitude of challenges: the war between the government and Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia and its impact on the region, an ongoing  dictatorship in Eritrea that interferes in the affairs of neighboring countries, a political dispute over Nile River water to be channeled through an Ethiopian dam that has led to growing tensions with Egypt and Sudan, concern over a Chinese military presence in Djibouti, periodic locust infestations and severe droughts that affect millions of people in the region.  The humanitarian crises alone would be challenging enough to manage for any diplomat – no matter how experienced.  In the case of Africa’s Horn, however, the many interlocking crises that spill beyond the Horn nations themselves have been particularly troublesome.

There has been a strong belief in Ethiopia that advisers to President Biden have been too partial to the TPLF and, therefore, not sufficiently neutral in the effort to resolve the fighting in Tigray.  Sanctions were levied on the Ethiopian government, including suspension of African Growth and Opportunity Act benefits.  But the Ethiopian government is just one of the elements involved in the fighting.  It seems the Administration doesn’t see itself having much leverage to use sanctions against the Government of Eritrea (beyond sanctioning individuals and organizations), the TPLF or the Amhara militia, who are also involved in the fighting and the creation of one of the world’s most problematic humanitarian crises.  Consequently, U.S. envoys don’t carry the diplomatic heft they might were they seen as honest brokers in this conflict.

The Tigray conflict has been the prime focus of U.S. special envoys.  Despite significant information provided to the U.S. Department of State, there has been minimal progress in finding ways to curb the interventionist policies of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, who has not only sent his military into the Tigray conflict, but also has provoked previous confrontations with Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti and Yemen.  More recently, Eritrea’s opposition in the United Nations for sanctions against Russia for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine indicates a developing relationship that could lead to Eritrea becoming not only a host for a Russian military presence but also make that East African country a potential depot for the growing Russian supply of weapons to African countries, global sanctions on Russia notwithstanding.

Camp Lemonnier is a United States naval expeditionary base, situated next to Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport in Djibouti City. It’s the headquarters of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa  (CJTF-HOA) of the U.S. Africa command (USAFRICOM), the primary U.S. tool to fight terrorism in Africa’s Sahel.  Camp Lemonnier is the only permanent U.S. military base on the continent.  Originally established as garrison for the French Foreign Legion, the base was leased by Djibouti to the United States in 2002, along with the right to use the neighboring airport and port facilities. The base supports Operation Enduring Freedom- Horn of Africa and is the centerpiece of a network of about six U.S. drone and surveillance bases across Africa. The other air bases are smaller and operate from remote hangars situated within local military bases or civilian airports. Due to its strategic location, Camp Lemonnier also serves as a hub for aerial operations in the Persian Gulf region.

Imagine then the concern within the U.S. Government in 2015 when the Government of Djibouti began negotiations with the People’s Republic of China for a military base in the country that resulted two years later in the Chinese People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti operated by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).  It is the PLAN's first overseas military base.  PLAN dispatched ships from the South Seas Fleet in Zhanjiang to open the base, which was ostensibly created only to support multinational anti-piracy efforts, help to secure vital shipping lanes and enable China to protect its citizens in the region.   Whatever the Chinese inducements to gain rights to construct the facility, the Djibouti government must undoubtedly see this as protecting themselves from Western domination.  Consequently, the potential danger of compromising a U.S. classified military base was likely seen as an American problem.  It remains a sore point, but one the Djibouti government is not concerned about mollifying.

Finally, after more than a year’s delay, Somalia has a new president and parliament, but faces significant challenges, not the least of which is the continued threat of violence from the terrorist group al-Shabaab.  The focus on the Tigray conflict surely limited efforts by the Special Envoy to devote significant attention to the situation in Somalia, including the ongoing effort by Somaliland to gain wider international support for its independence.

The reason special envoys for regions are appointed is to deal with issues that go beyond national borders.  Special envoys are intended to be the bridge between various bilateral diplomatic posts.  Jurisdictional jockeying aside, special envoys have a tough role in managing conflicts and coordinating humanitarian and refugee operations specifically managed by other officials.  I have known several special envoys, and they have spent significant time devoted to ending conflicts and seeing that crises are met with appropriate responses.  In the case of the Horn of Africa, the crises there predate all the special envoys and apparently will outlast them all as well.

U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa is a difficult job with scant chance for success.  The experience of the special envoys in the Horn certainly don’t look appealing, especially if three are appointed in less than two years.  Diplomats who care about their careers in foreign service can’t be eager to risk their hard-won reputations on a job that has seen others crash and burn quickly.  Given the significant amount of travel, tough negotiations with recalcitrant parties and the unending series of man-made and natural crises in the region, this is a job begging for takers but probably few takers willing to step forward on their own.