The Modern Scramble for Africa

             Between 1870 and 1900, the so-called “scramble for Africa” resulted in almost all the continent coming under European colonial control.  The United Kingdom (UK) and France held the most African territory, but Germany, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy also seized African territory.  To minimize or end this clash for land and resources such as gold, rubber, ivory and cocoa, the colonial powers entered into the Berlin Agreement in 1885 to allocate their African territories regardless of how it divided existing African societies, which has led to disputes and contention that still exist more than a century later.  Only Liberia, settled by freed Africans from North America, and Ethiopia (a historic empire that fought off Italian colonialism, resulting in the 1896 Treaty of Addis Ababa recognizing its independence).

            Colonialism allowed the colonizers to drain African natural resources using cheap labor.  This helped European countries to make significant progress in the Industrial Resolution, from which African colonies were denied participation. So, while textile mills and other factories were rising in European countries, their African colonies sent raw materials to the colonizing countries, only to buy back processed goods that they could have created themselves.

            There are two theories that attempt to explain the impact of colonialism.  According to the Modernization theory, colonial powers supposedly constructed infrastructure to integrate Africa into the world economy, but this was done specifically for extraction of African resources, and the transportation systems were exclusive to the needs of each colonizer without being integrated with each other.  So, when colonization was ended, these roads systems didn’t connect to neighbors that had been controlled by other European countries.

            The other, the Dependence theory, more accurately described the situation in which the design was to keep African countries dependent on outside control and influence in the world economy, relying on raw commodities processed outside the continent.  The fluctuating prices for raw commodities makes it difficult to plan a modern economy and implement any such plan successfully.  Until the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) challenged this system by creating incentives for African governments to collaborate in a continent-wide economic union, the dream of an integrate African market was only a fantasy.

            The economic system under colonialism was profitable for Europe (and to a lesser extent the United States), but several developments threatened to end this cozy arrangement.  Beginning in the 1930s, the Europeans thought they could extend their control by developing elite Africans who would be the black face of their dominance behind the scenes, but that didn’t quite work as they thought it would.

            Later national leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Julius Nyrere of Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria and Félix Houphouët Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire all learned the lesson of self-determination, and despite their adherence to some cultural elements from the colonizers, they returned home committed to leading independence movements. They found a receptive audience among their countrymen who had tired of being exploited, especially when their men were drafted into World War II to fight and die for a system that didn’t benefit them.

During that war, some local African industry and towns expanded when U-boats patrolling the Atlantic Ocean limited raw material transportation to Europe.  As urban communities, industries and trade unions grew and education increased literacy and learning in other areas, citizens began reading pro-independence newspapers.

After the war, the Fifth Pan-African Congress demanded the end of colonialism, and delegates included the future presidents of Ghana, Kenya and Malawi and many other national activists from various African countries.

However, just as internal and external pressure built to end colonialism, a long-developing resource trend made investment and control in African countries even more valuable.  In 1956, the first commercial exploitation of petroleum began in Nigeria’s Bayelsa state.  Within two decades, the country’s Delta region became known for holding some of the world’s largest reserves of gas and oil.  That period tracks with the growing mobility of people worldwide using fossil fuels.  Hydrocarbon exploration in North Africa started earlier in the 1950s, but it wasn’t until 1956 that major discoveries were made in the Maghreb region.  After several decades of only partially successful oil drilling in East Africa in 1920, it has taken more than half a century for East Africa to emerge as a significant source of hydrocarbons.

So, even as Europe, severely weakened by World War II, began to give up its African colonies, there was a major reason to find a means to maintain control of these resources.  The strategy turned out to be neocolonialism.  Using tactics such as economic and cultural imperialism and conditional aid, the European powers strived to maintain a condition of dependency among their former colonies.  This included the positioning of African leaders who sought and accepted advice on their policies and the advisors who were their conduits to the powers-that-be in Europe.  Some choices turned out to be disastrous, such as Equatorial Guinea’s Francisco Macías Nguema, who was mentally unstable and couldn’t be controlled by his Spanish “handler.”

The UK created the British Commonwealth of Nations to maintain an enduring link with all the former British colonies except those that became the United States.  It was first established through the 1926 Balfour Declaration.  Through this vehicle, the UK gradually loosened its governing ties through gradual self-governance.  The London Declaration of 1949 declared Commonwealth members states to be “free and equal.”  Still, complete decolonization lasted until 1980 when Southern Rhodesia cut ties with the UK and became Zimbabwe.

In contrast, France has had a unique strategy for maintaining control of its former African colonies: not only did France create the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (also known as La Francophonie) to promote the French language and culture among other started goals, but it devised a way to capture funds from its African colonies. Known as the colonial tax, the infamous obligation on the Financial Community of Africa (CFA) Franc Zone members requires them to keep more than half of their foreign exchange reserves in an operations account held at the French Treasury. The tax was intended ostensibly to pay a colonial debt for the benefits France brought to its colonies such as infrastructure. Beginning in 1961, France has held the national reserves of these 14 African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon.

For those non-colonial powers, the existing resources were attractive enough, but modern society eventually required other elements to sustain its technology, such as uranium, cobalt, platinum, chromium, tin, tungsten and tantalum, as well as gold.  As I’ve stated before, the mineral coltan (columbite-tantalite), largely coming from Africa, has enabled the development of computers, cell phones and other electronic devices. We would be hard-pressed to construct jet aircraft, automobile catalytic converters or iPods without the minerals found in Africa, and in some cases, almost nowhere else in the world. Conflict minerals, as they are sometimes called, have led to violence around mining sites and tempted buyers from many nations to seek them regardless of the destruction illegal mining has caused and despite such efforts as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

Now the increasing policy decision to move away from fossil fuels to renewable energy makes rare earth minerals such as neodymium (Nd), praseodymium (Pr), dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb) essential. Hybrid vehicles, rechargeable batteries, wind turbines and solar panels would not be possible without them. The thing is, what China produces now represents 95% of rare earth supplies, and the Chinese have instituted export controls on processed rare earth minerals.

South Africa used to be the world’s leading source for these minerals, and while that country still produces some rare earth concentrates, its production is dwarfed by what China produces. Chinese production often releases toxic wastes into the general water supply, and South African production is limited because of what could be expensive environmental safeguards that the Chinese don’t abide by.

Several years ago, my colleague Shehnaz Rangwalla, President and CEO of Leadership Global, and I developed a plan to build the capacity of critical “watchdog stakeholders” in African countries. This would enable citizens to serve their people and society much better through shining a brighter light on all deals with China and all other foreign economic partners. There are many other nations now eyeing Africa’s resources:

·         Although China has been the number one focus of attention for destructive investment in Africa, then-Africom head General Thomas Waldhauser testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2018 that Russia employs oligarch-funded, quasi-mercenary military advisors, particularly in countries where leaders seek unchallenged autocratic rule to help Russian interests gain access to natural resources on favorable terms. He pointed to the Central African Republic, where the Wagner Group had about 175 trainers, some of whom were in the President's cabinet influencing
training as well as having access to minerals in the country, but the end of the Soviet Union led to a lull of sorts in Russian targeting of Africa. More recently, however, Russian President Vladimir Putin has gradually increased its influence in Africa through strategic investment in energy and minerals. It is also using military muscle and soft power. Interaction between Russia and Africa has grown exponentially this century.  The Center for International Private Enterprise identified Russia (along with China) as being one of the sources of what it calls “corrosive capital,” which it defines as opaque capital that has a destructive effect on countries by encouraging corruption and advancing authoritarianism.

• While other nations have gotten greater attention for their interest in Africa, Turkey has increased its investments in Africa. Turkey imports oil and LNG from African markets. Algeria has become the fourth largest gas exporter to Turkey and Nigeria-Turkey bilateral trade constitutes 90% of Turkey’s LNG imports from Nigeria. In 2017, oil- and mineral-rich Chad announced its invitation to Turkish companies for oil extraction in the country.  The number of African embassies in Ankara has gone from 10 in 2008 to 37 in 2021, and state-controlled Turkish Airlines now flies to 61 African destinations. Turkey has opened a military base in Somalia, its first in Africa and the largest of its overseas bases. The fact that Turkey came to Somalia first in 2011, when no nation dared to go to Somalia, likely played a major role in getting that military base in Somalia.  Turkey also has joined China, Japan and other nations in conducting high-level conferences in Africa with its African Union-Turkey Cooperation Summit, held most recently in December 2021.

• A few years ago, the Africa - Malaysia Business and Investment Summit in Kuala Lumpur created a platform for investors from Malaysia seeking opportunities in Africa to network with dynamic businesses, industry leaders and policymakers. Malaysia’s modern relations with Africa have their roots in the late 1980s. Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s long-time former prime minister and Asian strongman, saw Africa as the last frontier. He viewed Africa’s poor, developing, and ex-communist states as an opportunity for Malaysian corporations to develop, gain valuable overseas experience, and quickly produce substantial revenues. In the shadow of China’s African engagement, Malaysian companies and policymakers built a sizeable presence across Africa over a two-decade period. In 2011, with investments of $19 billion at that point, Malaysia was in fact Africa’s most important Asian investor, ahead of China and India in terms of the size of its foreign direct investment until recent years. Petronas, Malaysia’s omnipotent national oil company, started its African expansion with investments in Sudan that were politically brokered by Mahathir.

• Another suitor for African trade and investment is Iran. From 2005 until his departure in 2013, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad relentlessly promoted the notion of an Iranian “South-South” strategy, in which states in Africa and Latin America would become Tehran’s allies and provide Iran with diplomatic and economic depth on the international stage. It was meant to compensate for Tehran’s then-deteriorating ties with its traditional economic partners in Europe and in East Asia. Aside from the since-ended oil trade with South Africa, Iran’s trade and investment was hindered significantly by US sanctions on Iranian companies. Nevertheless, Iran continues to invest in Africa’s human resources. For example, Iran supports the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, a Shiite extremist group led by Iranian-trained and supported Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky. There are now an estimated four million Shiites in Nigeria out of a total Muslim population estimated at more than 85 million. However, the educated, wealthier segments of
Zakzaky’s group could provide a proxy for Iranian trade and investment in Nigeria, as well as an advance guard for the terrorist group Hezbollah as some have speculated.

 

            Africa’s future lies largely in its natural resources.  Unbalanced deals for those resources by foreign elements not only impoverish African governments, but it also makes its people vulnerable to underdevelopment through bribery that entices government officials to enter into contracts that may be personally profitable but disastrous in the short-run and long term for their people. Some means of empowering African people to be watchdogs on their economic affairs is required.  International compacts have been shown not to work without buy-in from African officials who express their aversion to ceding control to international institutions. Analyses from inside their countries would be harder to ignore and less able to be dismissed.